

23 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary
Counterintelligence Analysis, 20 September 1983

1. Messrs. [] and Morrow highlighted sessions they had with
Community officials and recommended those they thought the entire Com-
mission should interview. After considerable discussion, members agreed
to invite the following individuals to meet with the entire Commission:

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Edward O'Malley, Deputy Assistant Director, Intelligence Division/FBI

James Nolan, Director, Office of Foreign Missions/Department of State,
(formerly with the FBI)

John Van Wagenen, Assistant Director, Investigative Staff/HAC
(formerly with the FBI)

L. Britt Snider, Director for Counterintelligence and Security
Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

[] Deputy Director for Operations/NSA

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[] Chief, Reports and Requirements, SE Division/DDO

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2. Individual Commission members will meet, or in some cases
revisit, the following, reporting their findings to the entire group:

Joseph L. Tierney, Section Chief of CI-3, FBI

John Elliff, Senator Huddleston's Designee, SSCI

[] Chief, Community Counterintelligence Staff/ICS

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[] (former C/CCS/ICS)

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James Angleton (former Chief, Counterintelligence Staff/DDO)

[] Chief, Foreign Intelligence Capabilities Group/DDI

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Jan Herring, former NIO for Science and Technology

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3. Members noted potential issues for consideration that had surfaced to date, including:

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4. [] observed that research so far had given him the impression that the performance of the Counterintelligence Community had improved markedly during the last 2-3 years. His preliminary inclinations were that some fine-tuning seemed in order, but no major changes. Members discussed Mr. Nolan's suggestion to create a "Mr. CI" who would report to a "troika" consisting of the DCI, D/FBI, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Mr. Bross observed that responsibility for counterintelligence should be consolidated, and the DCI should be the focal point for intelligence aspects. He thought that responsibility should be supported but not shared by DoD and the FBI. He suggested this function could be placed within the NSC structure, but he would prefer to see a DCI Committee.

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
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5. Protection of Air Force Special Access Programs. Mr. Bross welcomed Colonel Richard H. Troyer, Special Assistant to the Commander, Office of Special Investigations/Air Force; Mr. Richard F. Law, Director of CI/Investigations; and Mr. Charles R. Torpy, Deputy Director of CI/Investigations. He explained the Commission's interest in ascertaining if the Intelligence Community was adequately protecting its most sensitive technologies. Colonel Troyer briefed the Commission on the genesis of his responsibilities to protect the Air Force's most sensitive programs, which now number about 10-12. He outlined in detail security measures and administrative procedures that have been established, vulnerability assessments and foreign threat analyses that are undertaken continually, and defensive measures that are taken. He emphasized that he enjoys high-level management support backed up by personnel and resources and a high level of cooperation across the board. He affirmed that he was able to get from the Community the foreign threat analyses he needed.

6. Mr. Law reviewed his office's efforts to increase awareness of the hostile intelligence threat. They have identified key technologies outside the "Black World" that should be protected. Security advisors are then assigned to develop protection programs. He, too, got the support he needed from the Community. He noted the IG/CI and Defense Counterintelligence Board were helpful.

7. In response to questions, Colonel Troyer said that the Navy had similar programs to protect its sensitive programs. The Army had begun a small effort. Weaknesses in industrial security programs were noted.

8. Mr. Law observed that the existing counterintelligence analysis community was working well. He noted that the mechanisms he now taps did not exist prior to 1977. He opposed creating a large Community counterintelligence organization. He stated that the current system satisfies his needs, but he feared his interests would be lost in a large centralized organization. In response to questions, he said that the Air Force did have a career track enabling CI analysts to reach GS-15. He expressed concern that some good initiatives surfaced to the IG/CI become diluted. He thought the Community Counterintelligence Staff could serve the function others had proposed for a Community CI ombudsman. He noted that he often worked through that staff to task the Community for analyses.



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